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It Wasn't Me: Reply to Karin Meyers 
Rick Repetti 1 
Abstract 
This is my reply to Karin Meyers, "False Friends: Depend-
ent Origination and the Perils of Analogy in Cross-Cultural 
Philosophy," in this Symposium. Meyers generally focuses 
on exegesis of what Early Buddhists said, which reasona-
bly constrains what we may think about them if we are 
Buddhists. I agree with and find much value in most of her 
astute analyses, here and elsewhere, so I restrict my reply 
here to where we disagree, or otherwise seem to be speak-
ing past, or misunderstanding, each other. In this regard, I 
focus on three of her claims. Meyers argues that (1) Bud-
dhist dependent origination is not determinism; (2) at-
tempts at naturalizing Buddhism threaten to run afoul of 
her hermeneutics; and (3) I seem to err on both fronts. 
However, I have emphasized that I am not a determinist, 
and I am not as concerned with what Buddhists did say 
about causation and agency. As a philosopher, I am mainly 
concerned with what philosophers can say about them. 
1 Philosophy Department, Kingsborough Community College, City University of New 
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Thus, Meyers's criticisms of my work seem predicated on 
interpretations of ideas I do not exactly espouse. Thus, the 
"Repetti" that Meyers primarily critiqued, as the title to 
this Reply (hopefully humorously) makes clear, wasn't me! 
Whether I have failed to make my ideas clear, she has 
failed to accurately interpret them, or some combination 
of both, I am uncertain. Thus, I focus on trying to clarify 
those ideas of mine that Meyers seems to interpret in a 
way that I do not intend. 
Introduction 
I have the utmost respect for the positive, constructive work that Karin 
Meyers has contributed to this discussion, here and in the edited collec-
tion, as well as to her excellent exegetical work elsewhere, interpreting 
Vasubandhu, and so forth. However, I am puzzled by some of her criti-
cisms here, some of which seem to run afoul of the principle of charita-
ble interpretation. The "Repetti" she critiques arguably wasn't me, but an 
interpretation that I would question. (Hence, the title of this paper.) 
I was once guilty of similarly questionable interpretation when 
critiquing the work of Mark Siderits, in this journal (Repetti Reduction-
ism). Siderits kindly informed me that what Siderits says and Siderits's view 
are two different things, that the Paleo-compatibilist position that he 
adduced was simply "a" position he thought certain Buddhist reduction-
ists could take, and thus a position he was taken to delineating, but not 
one he was advocating as his own, nor as correct. I think a similar dis-
tinction is applicable here, our other (minor) disagreements notwith-
standing. 
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Meyers's Claims and My Replies 
First, we have a point of disagreement, but one that also suggests Meyers 
is not representing my views adequately. In her opening sentence, Mey-
ers assumes that there was no free will concept or discussion in Bud-
dhism until recently, stating "neither the idea nor problem of free will 
were part of Buddhist intellectual history prior to contact with western 
philosophy in the modern era" (787). A few paragraphs later, she also 
claims: "Repetti ... and most of the other contributors ... seem to agree 
that ... Buddhists did not have the idea of free will, much less a problem 
with it historically" (789). 
However, in the edited collection she refers to, I argued against 
that view, noting that: (1) despite the fact that the term "free will" is ab-
sent in pre-modern Buddhist history, enough elements of the concept 
occur (Repetti Why); (2) the Buddha rejected a number of inevitabilist 
views that cover the range of free will skepticism, committing him to 
acceptance of some cognate of free will, regardless of the absence of that 
exact term (Repetti Agentless); and (3) the attempt to reconcile karmic 
causation with the sort of voluntary behavior required for the Buddhist 
path comes close enough to aspects of the free will problem to be con-
sidered a Buddhist parallel (Repetti Introduction). In addition, I noted (In-
troduction) that: (4) two of the contributors, Mark Siderits and Charles 
Goodman, debate the extent to which the free will problem is reflected 
in the tension generated by the facially contradictory advice of the au-
thoritative Buddhist philosopher-sage, Santideva, which is to view oth-
ers' negative behavior impersonally, but to view our own behavior per-
sonally; and that (5) another contributor, Emily McRae, discusses a con-
gruent tension discernible in the similar advice of another Buddhist phi-
losopher-sage, Tsongkhapa. I devoted considerable attention to the nu-
ances on both sides of such views, so Meyers's remarks above seem to 
ignore those of my claims in Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will (to which 
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anthology she also contributed) that are relevant to the accuracy of her 
comments. 
Second, Meyers seems to critique an interpretation of my view 
that I would deny, and on grounds I also question. In footnote 11, Meyers 
objects to my therapeutic sort of suggestion (Repetti Why) that a Bud-
dhist theory of free will could play a role for Western, secular Buddhists 
who might by conditioned by a just-world assumption (an unconscious 
holdover from now-defunct belief in a creator God). I suggested that 
Buddhist beliefs in karma and rebirth may play what I dubbed a "soteri-
odical" (soteriological, theodicy-like) role, eventually to be transcended 
by becoming more deeply steeped in the no-self view, at which point 
non-belief in post-mortem survival no longer matters. Meyers argues 
that my suggestion is "dubious on both exegetical and pragmatic 
grounds" (fn. 11), the exegetical idea (presumably) being that most (non-
Western) Buddhists do not conceive of karma and rebirth that way, and 
the pragmatic idea being that most Western Buddhists find the idea of 
rebirth more difficult to assimilate than the idea of the no-self. This line 
of criticism is part of a larger theme that runs throughout Meyers's con-
tribution here, to the effect that Western philosophers who opt for a 
naturalized Buddhism may be unwittingly departing from Buddhism in 
some (unspecified but) important sense. 
I think Meyers's analysis partly misses the mark here in at least 
two ways. First, this comment ("dubious on both exegetical and prag-
matic grounds") seems to confuse most Western philosophers with most 
Westerners, but these are radically different animals. Whereas it is not 
unreasonable to think most of our contemporary Western academic colleagues 
(philosophers, scholars, intellectuals, etc.) are probably naturalists who 
are less comfortable with the idea of rebirth than they are with the idea 
that the self is some sort of construct, the average Western person is much 
more deeply committed to the substantive metaphysical nature of an 
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enduring self than they are to a denial of post-mortem survival. Second, 
Meyers interprets my therapeutic suggestion as an exegetical one, but it 
is not: It is a purely pragmatic justification for a possible soteriodical 
and/ or therapeutic role for a theory of free will that might carry the av-
erage Western person (not necessarily philosophers or scholars) some 
distance along the Buddhist path as they come to shift perspectives 
about the just-world assumption and the nature of the self. The idea, 
simply, is that many average Westerners have emerged from, but are 
probably still attached to, a just-world view that is no longer supported 
by monotheistic belief. There is enough in Buddhist doxology, such as 
the doctrines of karma and rebirth, that can serve as a temporary substi-
tute for the underlyingjust-world assumption for those so inclined. This 
substitute can feed those soteriodical needs while they slowly mature in 
the Buddhist path and gradually become comfortable with the no-self 
idea as they transform through contemplative experience. This was also 
but one (minor) among several (major) arguments I gave in support of 
the idea that there is, can be, and ought to be a Buddhist theory of free 
will. 
Curiously, later on Meyers endorses what she critically attributes 
to me as my strategy, although with her own twist-a twist which, on my 
analysis (see below), is not really different in one sense, but is very dif-
ferent in another. Meyers states: 
Instead of taking karma and rebirth as skillful means that 
might be replaced by a more naturalistic Buddhism, I sug-
gest a soteriodicy in which Buddhist naturalism serves as 
a skillful means to lure western seekers and Bu-curious 
philosophers to take up a seemingly naturalistic practice 
of Buddhist meditation, and then decide if their natural-
ism remains satisfying or plausible. (812) 
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My skillful-means-type suggestion, again, was just that Western-
ers tacitly possessed of a just-world assumption might be attracted to 
Buddhism because its twin doctrines of karma and rebirth could fulfill a 
theodicy-like function (soteriodicy: a godless analogue of theodicy that is 
soteriologically equivalent). This attraction could conceivably motivate, 
and promise some just-world-type comfort in, the soteriodical doctrines 
of karma and rebirth. (This would be regardless of whether they do so 
consciously or unconsciously, with more or less faith in a just-world the-
ory, or whether or not they do so in a supernatural, quasi-supernatural, 
or pseudo-natural sense, according as they are individually inclined.) 
Over time, as they gradually become comfortable with the idea of the no-
self, the no-self view could render the just-world view otiose. In my 
analogy, I compared monotheistic just-world-theory-based theodicy 
with heroin, and karma/rebirth soteriodicy with methadone, for recov-
ering theists, most of which are ordinary people drawn to meditation 
and Buddhism, not professional philosophers or scholars. I did not sug-
gest presenting Buddhism as seemingly naturalistic to naturalistic West-
ern philosophers or scholars in order to lure them into Buddhist medita-
tion practices that might engender supernatural experiences that would 
then implicitly challenge their naturalism. Flanagan, another contribu-
tor to the collection (Negative) that Meyers criticizes, does not do that 
either: he simply suggests that Buddhism can be naturalized, for philos-
ophers so inclined (Bodhisattva), and that Buddhism can do without a free 
will theory (Negative). 
Meyers, however, explicitly suggests presenting Buddhism as a 
seemingly naturalistic (but implicitly a stealth supernatural) philosophy in 
order to lure Western philosophers and scholars into meditation prac-
tices, implicitly with the idea that their contemplative experiences 
might not be able to be assimilated within their physicalism and natural-
ism. This line of reasoning suggests the sort of supernaturalism that she 
seems to imply might be necessary for (a more genuinely Buddhist) Bud-
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dhism. However, in suggesting that the supernatural elements are op-
tional for Western Buddhists, I am merely pointing out that these ideas 
are, in fact, optional for those who might prefer to see them as such. By 
analogy, it is optional for thus-inclined contemporary Catholics whether 
to believe that the Eucharist is literally the flesh-substance of Jesus, or for 
Jews whether to believe that pork is unclean; it is a separate question 
whether those who reject such beliefs remain true Catholics or Jews, re-
spectively, but that is not my concern. The supernatural beliefs Meyers 
seems to think are not optional for those who wish to remain Buddhists 
clearly are not what Descartes had in mind (in his Third Meditation) 
when he argued that we cannot help but believe propositions that are 
clearly and distinctly true. To the contrary, the supernatural beliefs 
Meyers has in mind are the sort of ideas about which Descartes would 
have thought we ought to withhold judgment: propositions that are nei-
ther clearly and distinctly true, nor clearly and distinctly false, but in the 
grey area in between, what William James called "live options." 
To the extent that each of us is responsible for our judgments re-
garding propositions that are neither clearly and distinctly true nor 
clearly and distinctly false (propositions about which Descartes thought 
we should withhold judgment), assenting to their veracity is clearly op-
tional as a matter of epistemology and as a matter of freedom of thought. 
Pragmatists like James would argue that for some of these sorts of prop-
ositions, pragmatic considerations require us to decide consciously 
whether to assent to them or not, namely, if they are necessary (meaning, 
if not deciding consciously implicitly entails a position on them) or mo-
mentous (meaning, of great consequence). If we-Buddhists or other-
wise-are not free to form our own judgments about things that are nei-
ther clearly and distinctly true nor clearly and distinctly false, then we 
are not free to form any judgments. For none of us is free to form our 
own judgments about things that are clearly and distinctly true (because 
we must believe those) or things that are clearly and distinctly false (be-
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cause we cannot believe those), as Descartes insightfully observed. Any 
ideology that demands that adherents cannot decide whether to lend 
assent to uncertain propositions is therefore multiply suspect. 
Insisting that certain metaphysical beliefs are not optional for 
members of a religious belief system might seem innocuous when it 
comes to the study of the doctrinal beliefs of followers of Early Bud-
dhism, say, but maintaining this sort of stance beyond those parameters 
would threaten to invalidate all but the earliest form of Buddhism, in 
which case I'm not sure the works of V asubandhu, Candrakirti, Nagarju-
na, or Santideva, for example, would be valid objects of genuine Buddhist 
study. That sort of thinking could also demand that true Catholics must 
believe in the transubstantiation of a piece of unleavened bread into the 
flesh of the deceased and resurrected body of Jesus, and that they engage 
in the ritual deivorous, cannibalistic act, once a week, of consuming that 
metaphysical substance in the Sacrament of Holy Communion. Consider-
ations such as these function as a reductio ad absurdum for the idea that 
otherwise ungrounded (supernatural) beliefs in what science currently 
considers fantasy are not optional for contemporary secular Western 
Buddhists. 
I acknowledge that a form of Buddhism that jettisons these su-
pernatural ideas may or may not be properly considered "traditional" 
Buddhism, depending on how we wish to define that term. I accept Bud-
dhists insisting that if these ideas are removed, the result is no longer 
traditional Buddhism, strictly speaking, but some derivative. But I have 
no objection to derivative forms of Buddhism, given its long and ever-
adaptive history. I have taken no position, nor argued for one, on the 
normative aspect of this issue, i.e., whether these ideas should be jetti-
soned, or, if they are, whether or not the resulting view is sufficiently 
Buddhist. In fact, later on, Meyers herself says (of me) that I am "quite 
aware of the fact that most Buddhists would not recognize a naturalized 
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Buddhism as Buddhist" (797, emphasis hers), so this line of reasoning, on 
her part, seems unnecessary, if it is thought to be directed at my views. 
In fairness to Meyers, many of her objections do not name me explicitly 
as their target, so it is possible they are not directed at me. In fairness to 
myself, however, Meyers does weave in and out of many objections, ex-
plicitly mentioning and quoting me, interspersed with these more gen-
eral objections, which gives the impression that most of them do target 
me, unless otherwise specified. In such cases, it is somewhat unclear. If 
any of these objections were not meant to be directed at my views, then 
my replies to those objections can be set aside, or at least the parts of 
those replies that assume that the objections are directed at my views. 
Meyers generally acknowledges the legitimacy of the sort of 
analysis of Buddhist thinking about free will that I employ, but seems to 
be worried that it might be being offered instead of an analysis that is 
more exegetical, stating: 
I would only urge that this be alongside and not in the 
stead of traditional Buddhist perspectives, and that we 
avoid any a priori assumption that modern naturalism has 
a greater claim on the possible or true than traditional 
forms of Buddhism. (I'm not sure Repetti would disagree.) 
(793) 
I would not disagree. I do not advocate the naturalism she worries will 
replace supernatural Buddhism, and I have no reason to reject the sort of 
exegetical analysis that would delve into the core doctrinal philosophy 
of traditional Buddhism, about which I am admittedly relatively agnos-
tic. I have made many remarks about how, as an analytic philosopher 
(and a long-term contemplative practitioner) I focus on what Buddhists 
can say, as opposed to what they have said or do say. I presented my 
views, not instead of, but "alongside" her own "traditional Buddhist per-
spective," and over a dozen other views of Buddhist philosophers and 
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scholars, some traditional, others not, in the aptly-named Buddhist Per-
spectives on Free Will (note the plural term in the title), to which Meyers 
contributed. My remarks introducing these diverse views (Preface; Intro-
duction) explicitly frame them as having been sequenced in a way to 
form a dialectical progression, with each subsequent article engaging in 
some way with the ones adjacent to it, forming a sort of philosophical 
conversation, a number of which contributions were of the sort Meyers 
seems to prefer, including her own contribution to that conversation. 
Again, in my own contributions to the anthology, I have made clear that 
a driving insight behind my motivation to explore possible Buddhist 
theories of free will is the fact that meditation virtuosos possess titanic, 
supernormal, and possibly supernatural abilities that make the mundane 
conception of free will set forth by the libertarian (as the strongest ver-
sion of free will on offer in Western philosophy, namely, the ability to 
have done otherwise under identical conditions) pale in comparison. 
Thus, I agree that contemporary naturalist assumptions ought 
not to be afforded such a superior a priori status that they automatically 
displace or replace traditional conceptions, and I doubt that I have given 
the impression that they should. Thus, I'm not sure what motivates re-
marks such as this last one, where Meyers urges against something I do 
not advocate. Although I did not press this point in the anthology, I do 
think that while there is no a priori argument against treating claims 
from pre-scientific eras as dismissible on that ground alone, or on the 
related grounds of their supernatural or magical content, there are a pos-
teriori arguments for favoring a scientific approach over a magical or 
pre-scientific one. 
Consider, for example, contemporary contemplative neurosci-
ence versus ancient contemplative claims, as reflected in a criticism of 
contemplative neuroscience that might be made by Buddhist practition-
ers to the effect that studying the brains of meditation practitioners 
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cannot increase our understanding of the mind in ways that meditation 
itself can, or that we cannot infer anything about the mind from anal-
yses of the brains of meditation practitioners, contrary to the phenome-
nal findings of contemplative neuroscience. There's validity in the gen-
eral critique of contemplative neuroscience as involving some potential-
ly misleading hyperbole (Van Dam et al.), but also validity in the provoc-
ative findings of contemplative neuroscience, such as the claim that 
meditation virtuosos like Mingyur Rinpoche exhibit otherwise extremely 
rare, momentary gamma waves as an enduring baseline state, and sever-
al multiples of gamma waves when practicing meditation (Goleman and 
Davidson 216-228). I would not favor the anecdotal mystical claims of 
someone from a pre-scientific age over those of neuroscience, as if the 
latter is less well founded than the former, or on equal footing. What ev-
idence is there for the former? If, as Meyers seems to think, these claims 
ought to be presented alongside each other, presumably as equally cred-
ible alternatives, then I would disagree. By analogy, evolution theory and 
intelligent design theory are not equally credible: not a priori, but pre-
cisely because a posteriori evidence massively confirms evolution theory, 
and there is little to confirm intelligent design theory, absent some sort 
of underlying metaphysical orientation. 
As skeptical philosopher Robert Nozick once said (158-159 ), ab-
sent supramundane background beliefs, what reason is there to believe 
the nondual mystical experience is more than just an unusual state in 
which the cognitive apparatus is damped down (like a stereo system that 
is on but is not playing anything)? It seems to be a case of special plead-
ing (double standard) to hold such a high level of skeptical scrutiny for 
neuroscience, yet almost no scrutiny for one's own supramundane belief 
system, one shrouded, no less, in esoterica about emptiness, anti-
realism, yogic perception, alternate dimensions that map onto trance 
states, etc. Although I tend to think there is something to the supramun-
dane experience more than Nozick suggests, based on my own mystical 
868 Repetti, It Wasn't Me 
experience, when claims based on mystical experiences compete with 
claims based in science, principles of parsimony and the like do general-
ly favor claims based in science. To think otherwise, as I more recently 
argued (Buddhism), begs the question in the sense that the grounds of 
such claims are in greater need of support than the claims themselves. 
Sometimes Meyers's comments seem to move in two directions at 
the same time. For example, she says, "I don't think he means it" (to 
which preface I would question why she suggests something she does 
not think I mean), adding, 
but because the analogy between the impersonal view of 
science and the Buddhist view of no-self does a fair bit of 
work in his soteriological justification for a Buddhist theo-
ry of free will, Repetti comes dangerously close at times to 
equating a modern scientific worldview with the ultimate 
truth of Buddhism. (794) 
I do compare them, but not as part of my soteriological justification of 
the theory of free will that I develop, but only for the sake of trying to do 
two things: (1) to help the reader understand the (otherwise incredibly 
impenetrable, if not convoluted) Buddhist two truths doctrine by refer-
ence to the analogous set of binary perspectives found in the scientific 
versus common sense (naive realist) views of the world; and (2) to put 
Buddhism in the respectable light of science. I clearly do not equate 
them, however. I also see nothing "dangerous" in relating them. 
Meyers (794) goes a step further, stating (of me) that "he adds the 
distinctively modern and western dichotomy between religion and sci-
ence into the mix," referencing my claim that "A Buddhist NOMA issue is 
arguably whether conventional Buddhist truth (e.g., Buddhist religion) is 
non-overlapping with ultimate Buddhist truth (akin to science)," as if 
being distinctively modern, western, or dichotomous might make "the 
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mix" (of my ideas) problematic, but without saying exactly what the 
problem is. (I will explain what a NOMA issue is shortly.) In response, I 
would call attention to certain words in my quoted sentence: "issue," 
"arguably," and "whether". It is "arguably" a legitimate philosophical 
point of curiosity or interest, i.e., an "issue," particularly a NOMA issue, 
"whether" Buddhist conventional truths (which are arguably religious) 
and Buddhist ultimate truths (which are arguably not religious, but more 
analogous to what science considers ultimately real or true) are compat-
ible or incompatible, or overlapping or non-overlapping, analogous to 
the NOMA issue. 
What is a NOMA issue? According to Gould, science and religion 
range over "non-overlapping magisteria" (NOMA). This idea may be 
viewed as an issue of whether and to what extent religious beliefs, which 
may be understood to be part of the non-scientific world view, are dis-
tinct from scientific ones, in such a way that they have their own crite-
ria, not necessarily the same sort of truth conditions that govern factual 
or scientific statements. Attempting to form a truce between them, 
Gould thought religion and science involve non-overlapping magisteria, 
with religion ranging over values and science ranging over facts. I think 
Gould is clearly wrong about that, as do most philosophers of religion 
and philosophers of science (as may be seen by considering whether in-
telligent design theory competes with evolution theory), but the idea is 
interestingly promising with respect to some interpretations of Bud-
dhism. I did not assert that Buddhism (per se, or parsed into convention-
al and ultimate terms) does, nor that it does not, fall into one or the oth-
er of the two categories, NOMA or non-NOMA (overlapping). Instead, 
again, I was simply mapping out interesting logical possibilities that 
might raise the level of philosophical discussion about the issue of Bud-
dhism and free will. 
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In general, almost everything I have said about Buddhism and 
free will is in the category of logical possibilities intended to raise the 
philosophical level of the discussion, as opposed to advocating views of 
my own-not that I never do that: sometimes I do advocate this or that 
point. But most of my points are made arguendo. Meyers goes on to admit 
(793) that she herself has made the sorts of comparisons I have made, 
and to suggest that her critique is driven by the need to differentiate be-
tween these ideas and comparisons-as if making such comparisons oth-
ers give the impression that these things are more alike than they are, as 
her title, "False Friends," suggests, but as if by delineating "the Perils of 
Analogy in Cross-Cultural Philosophy," as her subtitle has it, she is not. 
Admittedly, these impressions are plausibly deniable, and she does raise 
a number of legitimate concerns, but the extent to which they apply to 
my work or that of the other contributors to the anthology is unclear. 
Meyers takes issue with my claim, which I based on a book-length 
argument in its support by Mark Balaguer, that whether or not deter-
minism is true is an open empirical question. She also seems to think 
that I think that the answer to that empirical question somehow figures 
in determining the exegetical question about whether or not what the 
Buddha thought about dependent origination was that it was, or was not, 
deterministic. That's a multi-level stacking of assumptions. She states: 
Alongside authors who treat the question of whether de-
pendent origination is deterministic as an exegetical ques-
tion, Repetti cites Balaguer's discussion of the lack of deci-
sive empirical evidence regarding the indeterminism of 
neural events relevant to libertarian free will. I don't see 
how what science knows or discovers about our neural 
events has much to do with what the Buddha meant by 
dependent origination. On 202-203, however, Repetti 
makes the appropriate distinction between the empirical 
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and exegetical, so I assume this was just an oversight. (fn. 
13) 
871 
This passage places my comments alongside others in my text, as if their 
being thus placed implies something she questions but which I did not 
say, but later in the same passage Meyers acknowledges that I say the 
opposite of what she thinks I imply. But, rather than retract her earlier 
view, she retains it, and assumes that it was just an oversight on my part. 
In her case, there appear to be a number of oversights. For example, 
Meyers acknowledges (much later, in her penultimate footnote, fn. 28) 
two other things that call some of her own claims above into question. 
The first is that I conclude that both determinism and indeterminism 
could turn out to be inconsistent with Buddhism. That observation calls 
into question her implicit worry that I might be attributing determinism 
to Buddhism. The second is that, on one meditation master's under-
standing of Buddhist omniscience about the future, the future is open, 
insofar as better practice might alter the future. But the idea of an open 
future requires indeterminism, something Meyers just rejected (in the 
above quote) as irrelevant. Below, she also proposes regulative control, 
which entails the ability to bring about an event that is not determined, 
which ability requires indeterminism. What puzzles me is why she thinks 
the issue of indeterminism is irrelevant to the Buddhist conception of 
agency only when I mention it. 
Meyers also claims (which claim I will quote shortly below) that it 
is understandable that a philosopher cannot be expected to be an exe-
gete. However, I repeatedly emphasize my primary focus on what Bud-
dhists can say. That is a philosophical task, not an exegetical one, despite 
cases where the former may be constrained by the latter. I suggest a bet-
ter exegetical approach to interpreting "Repetti" texts would be one that 
takes my seemingly problematic remarks not as oversights unintention-
ally contradicted by other things I say, but rather as evidence that one 
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may have misinterpreted some of my statements by not first taking into 
consideration all of my statements and the context they collectively con-
struct. For context determines meaning, and the meanings of philosoph-
ical claims are typically developed in stages throughout an article, chap-
ter, or book, if not over the course of a research program, which latter 
applies here. 
Meyers goes on to critique my ideas as a function of my Western 
philosophical training and what she implicitly presumes to be also a 
function of my unfamiliarity with exegetical issues in Buddhist studies, 
stating: "I am less optimistic about his assertion that Buddhist traditions' 
'supernaturalisms' are 'plausibly optional,' and the further implication 
that these are irrelevant to the inquiry into a Buddhist theory of free 
will" (796). I have made it clear in all of my writings that I am not pri-
marily concerned with excavating what Buddhists have said or thought 
about free will or its cognates, but in what Buddhist philosophers can say 
about it, particularly in light of Western analytic philosophy. I have also 
argued forcefully that the alleged supernatural abilities of the medita-
tion virtuoso would enhance a Buddhist theory of free will, though the 
theory can stand independently of them, so I am puzzled by these re-
marks. Meyers further states: 
As a matter of textual interpretation and historical de-
scription, it is, of course, deeply problematic to rely on 
modern sensibilities about what is natural or plausible to 
decide what is essential to Buddhism. 
Given that his primary training is in western phi-
losophy, Repetti may not be aware of the extent to which 
this dynamic has infected modern interpretations of Bud-
dhism or the degree to which it is has been subjected to 
critique in Buddhist studies. (796) 
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Whereas trying "to decide what is essential to Buddhism" is a task Mey-
ers seems to take up, the similar (but minor, collateral) task I do take up 
(in the course of arguing for a certain view of free will that is informed 
by Buddhism) only incidentally involves not what is essential to traditional 
Buddhism, but merely to suggest, en passant, what may be considered in-
essential to contemporary western philosophers interested in Buddhism. 
If doing that sort of philosophical work-exploring what contemporary 
Buddhists and philosophers (with "modern sensibilities") can say about 
free will-automatically makes "this dynamic" (presumably, the dynamic 
of my relying on my own modern sensibilities) guilty of exegetical vio-
lence ("infect[ing] modern interpretations of Buddhism," and being 
oblivious to "the degree to which it has been subjected to critique in 
Buddhist studies"), then I am guilty as charged. But the antecedent to 
that hypothetical is not satisfied, for I am not engaged in the project of 
using a dynamic informed by modern sensibilities to excavate the origi-
nal meaning and essential doxological elements of early Buddhism. 
Meyers also seems to impute intentions to my arguments that I 
would deny, but, again, it may be that this one is not directly targeting 
my view, when she states: "the problem with letting naturalism inform 
interpretation of Buddhist doctrine is not merely descriptive; it also un-
dermines the broader constructive philosophical enterprise" (797). How-
ever, I do not let "naturalism inform interpretation of Buddhist doc-
trine." Rather, naturalism is but one of many paradigms that I consider as 
part of a broader set of possible approaches and perspectives, including 
supernaturalism, panpsychism, etc., and I do so not to "inform interpre-
tation of Buddhist doctrine," but to bring Buddhist ideas and insights 
into dialogue with contemporary philosophy and contemplative neuro-
science. Again, Meyers does not explicitly identify me as one who lets 
naturalism inform interpretation of Buddhist doctrine, but she presents 
such remarks alongside enough similar remarks that do name me to jus-
tify the impression that they are aimed at my overall "dynamic." 
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Meyers goes on to suggest that Westerners who flirt with Bud-
dhist naturalism may be guilty of colonialism, or what I will dub "West-
splaining," when she says that, "by excluding ideas that we don't find 
congenial, we embody a kind of intellectual colonialism that forecloses 
opportunities to submit our own philosophical assumptions to scrutiny 
and to be genuinely transformed by our encounter with another tradi-
tion" (797). Two quick replies are in order. 
First, in the Preface to the anthology, I state that I was drawn to 
philosophy and Buddhism because, in my first meditation I had an out-
of-body experience and countless subsequent related precognitive, 
transcendent, and related mystical meditation-based experiences that 
were inexplicable from the perspective of the physicalist's/naturalist's 
paradigm. They permanently altered my life trajectory, leading fairly 
directly to this combined work in analytic philosophy applied to the 
question of free will in Buddhism. Thus, I was obviously "genuinely 
transformed by [my] encounter with another tradition," something 
Meyers compliments me for sharing (but then seems to cancel after-
wards, to be discussed shortly). Second, throughout my many imagina-
tive chains of philosophical exploration in the anthology, I am anything 
but "excluding ideas I don't find congenial" or "foreclosing possibilities." 
To the contrary, the bulk of my philosophical work, if not my philosoph-
ical modus operandi, is conceiving alternate possibilities and paradigms, 
even to ideas I find congenial. Again, I am not named in that objection, 
but it is not unreasonable to think it is being presented as applicable to 
my views. 
As with her previous, initially questionable characterization of 
my claims followed by her subsequent imputation of an alleged slip on 
my part, Meyers goes on, in the very next paragraph, to mention my out-
of-body experience, as if it is an "irony" that this happened to me but 
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fails to inform my thinking. But it is only her uncharitable interpretation 
of my remarks that gives the impression that the irony is on me. 
I respect Meyers for (perhaps overzealously) trying to protect the 
core subject matter of her own (otherwise excellent) work in excavating 
exegetical gems from canonical and/ or authoritative Buddhist texts 
without distorting their true meaning. It is a noble intention, surely 
what the Buddha would consider Right Intention, to preserve the Dharma 
as transmitted. In referring to those of my own mystical experiences 
that led me to study the Dharma, Meyers states: 
This bit of personal history (which I commend Repetti for 
including) suggests to me, at least, that the fact that Bud-
dhism countenances such experiences within a radically 
different conception of mind and world than found in our 
modern naturalisms-which tend to reject or explain 
away such experiences (e.g., Blackmore Seeing)-is not ir-
relevant to our inquiry. Put another way, the fact that 
traditional forms of Buddhism do not share our under-
standing of the "natural" (and hence "supernatural") is 
significant. (798) 
I agree. I make clear (Preface) that one of the things that appeals to me in 
Buddhism is precisely the fact that it promises to make sense of those 
mystical experiences of mine in ways that are not possible within the 
standard Western philosophical paradigms. 
What I do not understand is why she thinks I advocate Buddhist 
naturalism, rather than simply put it on the table as an interesting philo-
sophical project, among others to be considered (by those who wish not 
to be "ethnocentric," to quote her quoting (797) of Flanagan), when I 
have stated that I cannot explain my most meaningful philosophical ex-
periences within a naturalistic framework. Showing ways in which this 
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or that aspect of my analysis may be consistent with naturalism is not 
something to be embarrassed about, on the one hand, nor does it entail 
an aversion to supernaturalism, on the other hand. To the contrary, it 
bears repeating that a key premise in almost anything I've ever written 
about Buddhism and free will is that the sort of agency exhibited by 
Buddhist meditation virtuosos is so titanic and supernatural that it 
makes the libertarian's allegedly strong free will conception-the mere 
ability to have done otherwise under identical conditions-appear weak. 
This is anything but an aversion to supernaturalism. 
In the very next sentence, Meyers directs her criticism to what 
may be seen as yet another case ofWest-splaining committed by another 
contributor to the edited collection, Owen Flanagan, despite the fact that 
Flanagan goes to great length to catalogue variously better and worse 
modes of cross-cultural philosophy and apply that matrix of possibilities 
to the issue of Buddhism and free will. Meyers states: "In this regard, one 
might note the performative contradiction in Flanagan's contention that 
naturalized Buddhism offers a serious counterpoint to western concerns 
about free will and thus protection against 'philosophical projection and 
ethnocentrism"' (Meyers 797, quoting Flanagan Negative 70). Flanagan is 
much more careful about his claim than Meyers suggests, however, for 
he is referring to the putative fact that Buddhism gets along just fine 
without belief in free will-that is his point here, not naturalism. 
Meyers herself acknowledges the philosophical fruitfulness of a 
project of seeing what can be naturalized in Buddhism, separate from the 
question whether it ought to be naturalized, so it is questionable why she 
casts Flanagan's naturalization project as a performative contradiction, 
simply because he explicitly acknowledges the possible dangers of ap-
proaching cross-cultural philosophy in a manner that threatens to dis-
tort. But whereas Flanagan is explicitly engaged in the project of natu-
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ralizing Buddhism and advocating for it, I am not engaged in that pro-
ject, much less advocating it. 
In her concluding section, Meyers kindly describes some of my 
ideas as raising the level of the discussion, even over her own previous 
attempts. But in the same section she suggests that I may be employing 
some sort of bait and switch strategy to lure Western philosophers into 
engagement with Buddhism by presenting them with an intentionally 
disguised appearance of naturalism cloaking a hidden supernaturalism: 
Despite the fact that Repetti relies on the idea of natural-
izing Buddhism in order to justify inquiry into a Buddhist 
theory of free will, his conclusions in chapter seventeen 
do not require naturalizing Buddhism, nor does naturali-
zation enter into his discussion there. Indeed, one might 
even get the impression that all the talk of naturalization 
may have just been a ploy to lure philosophers afraid of 
"hocus pocus" (Flanagan Bodhisattva's) into a conversation 
with Buddhism, and not a true conviction in the idea that 
Buddhism can or should be naturalized. (812) 
Three responses are in order, following an emerging pattern. First, this 
passage ignores the fact that I rely primarily and explicitly on the Bud-
dha's own rejection of a number of forms of inevitabilism that constitute 
the bulk of the forms of free will skepticism, and I only mention the po-
tential for naturalism as one among many other minor possible justifica-
tions, and not as one that I personally advocate. Thus, it is not a "fact 
that Repetti relies on the idea of naturalizing Buddhism in order to justi-
fy inquiry into a Buddhist theory of free will," as I do not rely on that 
strategy. 
Second, this passage seems to run afoul of the principle of chari-
table interpretation. Instead, third, Meyers could easily have, and should 
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have, taken the fact that my "conclusions in chapter seventeen do not 
require naturalizing Buddhism" and the fact that naturalization does not 
even "enter into his discussion there" and relied on those two remarks 
in order to avoid misinterpreting me as someone advocating naturalism 
in the first place. I do not engage in a bait and switch ploy, though Mey-
ers explicitly advocates such a ploy. 
A good part, if not the better bulk, of Meyers's analysis is not di-
rectly critical of my work or of the entire collection, but rather is taken 
up by her own positive analysis of the history of the shifting conceptual 
content to the notion of dependent origination throughout the different 
(mostly early) periods of Buddhism. I have no objection directly targeted 
to this fine feature of her work; in fact, I think a lacuna in Buddhist phil-
osophical scholarship that needs to be addressed concerns the Buddhist 
understanding(s) of the nature of causation and which, if any, contem-
porary understandings may be coextensive, overlapping, or different. 
However, this aspect of her work is nonetheless indirectly critical of my 
analysis and that of most of the other contributors to the edited collec-
tion insofar as it constitutes the basis for her criticism of comparing the 
Western scientific conception of determinism with dependent origina-
tion, the latter of which she shows has more differences than commonal-
ities with the former than recent commentators emphasize. Fair enough, 
in one sense, but perhaps not so, in another. 
There is certainly a difference between any of the conceptions of 
dependent origination Meyers identifies and determinism; for example, 
dependent origination in its earliest rendering seems narrowly restrict-
ed to the chain of psychophysical links connected with soteriological 
progress, the narrow scope of which certainly differs from that of uni-
versal causation. However, any narrowly-scoped causal sequence will 
always differ in scope from universal causation, but, by analogy, the 
causal rules that determine transitions between H20's solid, liquid, and 
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gaseous states are narrow in scope, but these are merely particular in-
stances of this or that specific type of causal relationship: all such specif-
ic causal relationships, such as laws of genetic inheritance or electron 
bonding, however, fall under the broader category of universal causa-
tion, and are subject to it, whether we focus on this aspect of causality or 
not. 
The arguably ostrich psychology strategy of not noticing univer-
sal causation does not exempt particular causation from universal causa-
tion, nor would a specific karmic cause/ effect pair be exempt from the 
global interconnectedness of all conditioned phenomena (interdepend-
ence). Thus, this scope difference alone does not automatically guaran-
tee a valid element of disanalogy. Likewise, nor do the other elements of 
disanalogy she identifies, such as Gowans's emphasis (in the anthology) 
on the organic (agrarian) examples of later, more broadly conceived in-
terpretations of dependent origination that are somewhat broader in 
scope, though not explicitly universal. That is arguably more ostrich 
psychology, but not looking at the causal structure of the world doesn't 
make it go away. 
This should go without saying, but many otherwise insightful an-
alysts frequently miss this basic element of analogical critique. (Meyers's 
paper is subtitled "Dependent Origination and the Perils of Analogy in 
Cross-Cultural Philosophy," so I would expect her analysis of the main 
analogy in question to be one that avoids the perils of analogical reason-
ing.) Thus, all analogies between any two things A and B, by definition, 
must have some disanalogous elements, otherwise they are not two dif-
ferent things (in the latter case, A and Bare just two instances of the ex-
act same thing, or A=A, where A appears under a different description as 
B). Therefore, merely noting some disanalogous elements between any 
two non-identical entities A and B cannot automatically invalidate the 
A/B analogy in question. Rather, the differences between A and B re-
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quired to undermine the analogy between A and B must be relevant dif-
ferences, where the relevantly disanalogous elements must be those that 
directly undermine the intention or point of the analogy. It is not clear 
that Meyers's otherwise astute analysis of the differences between the 
various conceptions of dependent origination reveals those differences 
to be sufficiently relevant to the points of the analogies to invalidate 
them. 
Of course, philosophical analysis should be sensitive to differ-
ences in conceptions between dependent origination and determinism, if 
any, when comparing them. But it does not follow from the fact that 
they are different in various ways that they cannot be intelligently com-
pared at all, nor that they should not be compared, unless they are so 
different that they cannot be intelligently compared at all, in which case 
they would have no analogous elements. Nothing in Meyers's analysis 
suggests that they are so different that it would be unintelligible or a 
category error to even try to compare them. By analogy, the mere fact 
that neurological phenomena (such as Meyers suggested were complete-
ly off base in my reference to them) and biological phenomena (such as 
Gowans's agrarian, organic model) are different from chemical or atomic 
phenomena in no way invalidates the idea that they may all be analyzed 
from a deterministic perspective, or an interdependence perspective, 
contrary to the opposite ostrich psychology impression. Meyers's paper, 
again, is entitled "False Friends: Dependent Origination and the Perils of 
Analogy in Cross-Cultural Philosophy," but the greater perils of analogy 
in her own cross-cultural philosophy may not be so much the ones she 
points to as the ones directing her to point. 
Besides, some quite respectable, brilliant Buddhist scholars take 
the view that Buddhist causation is deterministic; some of them (e.g., 
Goodman) were printed in the anthology, alongside my article and hers. It 
may or may not be the case that Buddhist causation is rightly considered 
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deterministic, but that is not a central concern of mine. The gist of my 
main argument (Agentless) is precisely that it doesn't matter what the 
nature of causation is from the perspective of the Buddhist meditation 
virtuoso. For the virtuoso enjoys not only freedom of the will, but mental 
freedom. That mental freedom is attainable regardless of not only the 
nature of causation (deterministic, indeterministic, neither, or both), but 
even if manipulated by nefarious neuroscientists, if embodied as a brain 
in a vat, or if downloaded into a digital mind. Surely this main claim-of 
the great power of Buddhist mental freedom-bears on Meyers's con-
cerns, revealing them to be unfounded or misplaced. 
In her concluding section, Meyers mentions my mystical experi-
ences as the sort of thing Buddhism could explain (if only I was recep-
tive), and implicitly depicts me as being unaware of what Buddhists have 
to say about those experiences, and as likely being insensitive to reasons, 
stating: "Learning what Buddhists have to say about these things proba-
bly won't affect Repetti's soft compatibilist account" (813). She proposes 
what is presented as if it is a stronger alternative to my account, that in-
cludes genuine regulative control, which requires indeterminism, as op-
posed to the sort of pseudo-regulative control that is possible in a de-
terministic world. (Genuine regulative control is my description, taken 
from Fischer, for the libertarian's ability to do otherwise.) Engaging with 
such contemporary Western ideas and the philosophical dynamic they 
are embedded in, it should be pointed out, is something that concerns 
Meyers, but only when I do so. 
Yet again, Meyers ignores that I emphasize-and have been em-
phasizing for about a decade now-that the sort of titanic mind-control 
and psychic abilities depicted by Buddhist meditation virtuosos clearly 
surpass the libertarian's otherwise mundane ability to have done other-
wise, e.g., the libertarian claims that while she chose the tofu, she could 
have chosen the seitan, all other things being identical. Meyers appar-
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ently fails to grasp my simple definition of soft compatibilism: contrary 
to hard incompatibilism, which holds that free will is incompatible with 
determinism and with indeterminism, soft compatibilism holds that free 
will is compatible with determinism, with indeterminism, with both, 
and/ or with neither. Buddhist soft compatibilism simply holds that Bud-
dhism is compatible with soft compatibilism. Again, the sort of control 
that I argue is exhibited by Buddhist meditation virtuosos makes Mey-
ers's allegedly "stronger" regulative control-the libertarian's mere abil-
ity to have done otherwise-appear facile, but I do not even reject that 
form of regulative control. I simply note that it is arguably optional. 
Again, Meyers ignores what I have said about the role of my own 
physicalism-challenging meditation experiences, what I have said about 
the powers of meditation virtuosos, and what I have said about what 
Buddhism can say about them, directly stating or indirectly implying or 
suggesting that I'm unaware of this, that I haven't taken it seriously, or 
that I have ruled out things that I have not ruled out, stating: 
But perhaps the real payoff for taking what Buddhists say 
on these matters seriously, for not automatically bracket-
ing or ruling out the bits of Buddhism that smack of su-
pernaturalism, is that it may turn out that our current 
naturalisms are insufficient to explain these and other 
human experiences. In other words, Buddhism may track 
features of our world (or worlds) that are worth knowing 
about but regularly excluded from our current natural-
isms. (813) 
Apart from the fact that implicit assumptions driving this quote seem 
clearly to refer to her corrective for me, I couldn't agree with this quote 
more. It simply does not apply to me. 
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In her concluding sentence, Meyers states: "Rather than relying 
on Gould's NOMA thesis to guide our cross-cultural philosophical inquir-
ies, perhaps we should aim for a more expansive, borderless, and emi-
nently revisable magisterium" (814). Considering her implicit and some-
times explicit defense of a somewhat restrictive conception of Bud-
dhism, which has normative implications regarding which (original) 
Buddhist beliefs are canonical and which (contemporary, western, scien-
tific, or naturalistic) beliefs threaten to transmogrify Buddhism, her as-
pirational use of the phrase "more expansive, borderless, and eminently 
revisable" seems inconsistently applied. Whoever it is that Meyers 
thinks is "relying on Gould's NOMA thesis to guide our cross-cultural 
philosophical inquiries," or doing most of the things she seems to think I 
am doing in the anthology, my reply is the same: It wasn't me. 
I began by noting that either I have failed to express my own 
views clearly, Meyers has misunderstood them, or some combination of 
both. I have reviewed several of the claims Meyers seems to attribute to 
me, alongside several very related claims that were not explicitly di-
rected at me, but which may reasonably be taken to be implicitly part of 
her general critique of my approach, and tried to show how they some-
how miss the mark if they are indeed directed at my work. It is admitted-
ly unclear whether some of her remarks that I have replied to were even 
directed to my work, but I thought it might be helpful to respond to 
them as if they were, just to clear up any possible misconceptions. I hope 
I have succeeded in clarifying anything that may have been unclear. 
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